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Successful Large-scale International Borrower 
by Klaus Fertig, Hamburg* 
At the end of 1982 South Korea had foreign debts of US $ 38 billion, the third highest total for a developing 
country after those of Mexico and Brazil. In contrast to these countries, however, South Korea has avoided 
debt crises so far. In view of the 20 or more rescheduling operations carried out in 1982, the country is at 
present a model for a successful programme of borrowing. The development of this Far Eastern country 
therefore deserves closer examination. 
i n 1959 South Korea still had no foreign debts. 1 The large balance of payments deficits on current account 
that had been incurred since the end of the Korean War 
(1950-53) had been offset almost entirely by military and 
economic aid in the form of grants. It was not until the 
sixties that this inflow of resources was supplemented 
and replaced by borrowing abroad. As the current 
account deficits remained persistently high - they 
represented about 9 % of gross domestic product in the 
sixties and around 7 % in the seventies - the debt 
burden grew significantly faster than that of most other 
developing countries. According to OECD estimates, 
the country's outstanding debts of US $ 38 billion at the 
end of 1982 placed it equal third with Argentina behind 
Mexico and Brazil in the developing countries' debt 
table. 2 
So far, however, South Korea has not suffered debt 
crises in spite of the rapid increase in its indebtedness. 
The country has always serviced its debts in 
accordance with the agreements and has won a 
reputation as a model borrower on the capital markets. 
This contrasts with the general situation on the 
international financial markets, which are currently 
afflicted by a rapidly growing number of repayment 
crises. 
In August 1982 Mexico, the largest borrower in the 
Third World, had to request the postponement of due 
debt service payments. Since then Brazil and Argentina, 
which are also large debtors, have opened negotiations 
to rescheduie their borrowing. Last year 22 countries 
had to reschedule a total of about $ 40 3 billion. Against 
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economic relations). 
this background it is even more remarkable that South 
Korea has apparently been successful in her use of 
foreign capital. The conditions for borrowing by this Far 
Eastern country therefore deserve closer examination. 
All borrowing gives rise to interest payments. The use 
to which the borrowed funds are put must generate 
adequate income to pay the interest charges if the 
commitment is to be met without prejudicing 
consumption. Developing countries have particularly 
little scope for curbing consumption to make room for 
interest payments, so that it is all the more important hat 
the product from investments financed with foreign 
loans should be greater than the interest payable. To put 
it in technical terms, the marginal productivity of the 
foreign capital must be higher than the real interest rate 
payable on it. 4 The first and most important condition for 
successful borrowing is therefore that earnings from 
investments should exceed the capital costs (the 
criterion of efficiency). If this requirement is not met, the 
country is not competent o borrow. 
Adequate earnings to meet the capital costs are all 
the more certain the higher the proportion of the inflow of 
1 Cf. A. O. K r u e g e r : The Developmental Role of the Foreign 
Sector and Aid, Studies in the modernization of the Republic of Korea, 
1945-75 (Harvard East Asian Monographs, 87), Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London 1979, p. 112. 
2 Cf. O E C D : 1982 Survey of External Debt of Developing Countries, 
Paris 1982. 
Cf. R~ckzug der Banken gef~.hrdet Weltwirtschaft, in: Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 27. 1. 1983. 
4 Cf. A. G u t o w s k i : Foreign Indebtedness and Economic Growth: 
Is there a limit to Foreign Financing? Paper presented for the 
conference of the International Economic Association on Financing 
Problems of Developing Countries, Buenos Aires, 26-30 October 1981 ; 
A. Gutowsk i ,  M. Ho l thus :  Limits to international 
Indebtedness, contribution to the conference of the Soci6t6 
Universitaire Europeenne de Recherches Financi~res (SUERF) on 
International Lending in a Fragile World Economy, Vienna, 22-24 April 
1982. 
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capital used for investment purposes (the 
transformation criterion); the greater the share of foreign 
capital that goes on consumption, the higher must be 
the profitability of the investment hat can be made with 
the remainder in order to generate sufficient funds to 
service the debt. 
The fact that debt service commitments are 
denominated in foreign currency must also be taken into 
account when borrowing abroad. The foreign exchange 
need not be earned immediately. If the flow of resources 
from abroad is organised efficiently enough, the 
borrowing country will be able to postpone all or part of 
the real transfer associated with debt servicing and 
concentrate on building up the capital stock at home. 
Over the long term, however, the structure of production 
should be geared towards earning the necessary 
foreign exchange by increasing exports and/or reducing 
imports (the transfer Criterion). 
The development of a country should therefore be 
examined closely in the light of these three criteria - 
efficiency, transformation and transfer - when 
assessing its borrowing ability. 
Remarkab le  Process of Development  
In 1960 South Korea was one of the poorest countries 
in the world. It was still suffering badly from the effects of 
the Second World War and especially the Korean War. 
Many of the public amenities had still not been rebuilt, 
industry was in its infancy and the partition of the country 
had cut the South off from mineral raw material deposits 
in the Noah. Agricultural production had reached a high 
Table 1 
Selected Development  Data 
1960 1980 
Per capita income (in US $) 83 1,520 
Population (in millions) 25 38 
Labour force (in millions) 8.3 a 14.7 
Percentage of total employment accounted 
for by 
- agriculture 66 34 
- manufacturing industry 9 29 
Percentage of GDP generated by 
- agriculture 37 16 
- manufacturing industry 20 41 
Imports as a percentage of GDP 12.6 41.7 
Exports as a percentage of GDP 3 33 
Savings as a percentage of GDP 2 23 
a 1963. 
Sources :  World Bank: World Development Report 1982, 
Washington, D.C., 1982; National Bureau of Statistics, Economic 
Planning Board, Republic of Korea: Korea Statistical Yearbook, various 
years. 
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level owing to the efforts of Japan, the occupying power 
until the Second World War, to develop the country 
systematically as a rice bowl to supply its own food 
requirements. Profits were unsatisfactory even here, 
however, owing to the inefficient way in which 
agriculture and forestry were administered .5 No wonder 
many observers wrote South Korea off as a laggard 
incapable of self-sustained growth. 6 
At the beginning of the sixties, however, a strongly 
development-oriented leadership came to power. There 
was a marked upward turn in activity with the 
implementation of a programme to promote 
industrialisation that was geared towards world markets 
from the very outset owing to the paucity of indigenous 
natural resources; it also applied the principles of the 
market economy and by no means neglected 
agriculture. The guiding influence of the State and its 
planning authorities was supplemented increasingly by 
the dynamic and flexible development of the p.rivate 
sector. In view of the constant threat from the hostile 
North, the population's acceptance of economic 
performance targets was strengthened by equating 
economic growth with national security. 7 South Korea's 
real growth rate of 8.3 % a year from 1961 to 1980 was 
appreciably higher than that of most other developing 
countries. 8 
Today South Korea ranks among the newly 
industrialised countries with middle-range income. 
Industry's contribution to national income far outweighs 
that of agriculture, while exports account for around 
one-third of gross domestic product, so that South 
Korea is now the largest exporter of manufactured 
goods among the developing countries. 9 As the country 
has also become one of the largest borrowers in the 
Third World, the role of capital in general and that of 
foreign capital in particular warrant closer attention. 
Rapid Capital  Formation 
At the beginning of the period of growth in the early 
sixties the available capital base was very narrow. The 
5 The first development plan cites this as one of the main reasons for the 
low level of development a that ime. Cf. Republic of Korea, Economic 
Planning Board: Summary of the First Five-Year Economic Plan 1962- 
1966, Seou11962, p. 9. 
6 Cf. L. E. W e s t p h a I : The private sector as "principal engine" of 
development: Korea, in: Finance and Development, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 
1982, pp. 34-38. 
Cf. M. E I i : Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsperspektiven d r Republik 
Korea, Hamburg 1979, p. 157. 
8 Calculated on the basis of data published by the World Bank (World 
Tables 1976 and 1980) and by the National Bureau of Statistics of the 
Korean Economic Planning Board (Korea Statistical Yearbook). 




extensive destruction of buildings and plant during the 
Korean War, which Brown estimates to have been equal 
to the country's entire national product for 1953, l~ was 
not offset by investment in the post-war years, which 
was low by international standards. 
After 1960, however, the capital input was increased 
considerably; indeed, during the sixties it rose faster 
than in any other country in the world. 11 The high rate of 
growth in investment could not be sustained in the 
seventies, but the capital stock was still being expanded 
at around twice the average rate for developing 
countries. The investment ratio of 34 % recorded in 
1980 was exceeded by only eight countries in the entire 
world, 
Efficient Use of Capital 
All the indications are that the country managed to 
employ the rapidly expanded capital stock in a highly 
profitable way. This is revealed by, for example, the 
level of the marginal capital/output ratio (the ratio 
between the additional capital input and the additional 
output). According to this indicator, a marginal capital 
productivity of over 40 % was achieved in the sixties. 
This high level of profitability could not be maintained 
during the seventies, however, particularly in the 
second half of the decade. 12 Nevertheless, at over 
20 %, the marginal capital productivity recorded during 
this period was well above real interest rates on foreign 
funds. 
A closer examination of changes in the structure of 
investment reveals the reasons for the highly efficient 
deployment of capital. Over the years the country 
increasingly exploited opportunities to invest in the 
sectors of manufacturing industry in which it enjoyed 
international competitive advantages. In the sixties 
these were first labour-intensive branches of light 
industry, later to be joined by sections of the chemical 
industry, capital goods industries (such as transport 
equipment) and specialised high-technology industries 
(such as electronic equipment). Investment in other 
sectors, in particular infrastructure and agriculture, was 
by no means neglected. Furthermore, in expanding the 
capital stock, modern technology was adopted on a 
lo Cf. G. T. B r own:  Korean Pricing Policies and Economic 
Development in the 1960s, Baltimore 1973, p. 31 ft., quoted in L. L. 
W a d e, B, S. K i m : Economic Development of South Korea. The 
Political Economy of Success, New York and London 1978, pp. 17-18. 
11 Cf. here and in the subsequent paragraphs Wor ld  Bank :  
World Development Report 1982, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 116 ft. 
12 Accordingto an international comparison carried out by the World 
Bank, South Korea was still one of the most efficient developing 
countries in the world up to 1973. Cf. Worrd  Bank :  World 
Development Report 1981, p. 68. 
Table 2 
Inflow of Resources from Abroad, Capital Input 
and Capital Productivity 
1954-60 1960-70 1970-80 
Average annual inflow of resources 
from abroad (as percentage of GDP) 8.3 9.0 7.0 
Average investment ratio 9.6 19.1 32.2 
Annual growth in investment 7.3 23.6 13.4 
Annual growth in gross 
domestic product 4.1 8.6 9.5 
Marginal capital/output ratio 
(annual average) 2.5 2.3 4.6 
S o u r c e : The author's own calculations. Cf. K. F e r t i g : Korea: 
Auslandsverschuldung im Wachstumsproze8 (in preparation). 
large scale, including that developed abroad. Imports of 
investment goods increased as a proportion of total 
imports from 11% in the period 1956-60 to roughly 
30 % in the seventies. 
Other Efficiency Factors 
The high efficiency of the deployment of capital in 
South Korea was enhanced by a series of 
complementary factors. The most important of these 
was the size and calibre of the labour force. The rapid 
economic growth was only possible because of a rapid 
increase in employment. In both the sixties and the 
seventies the number of persons employed increased 
much faster than the average for developing countries. 
Over the two decades the number of jobs was practically 
doubled from something over 7 million to almost 14 
million. More important, however, was the fact that this 
reservoir of labour had to be regarded as extremely well 
educated by international standards. 
In 1960 the literacy rate already stood at 71%.13 In 
the next two decades the country built on this legacy by 
making further efforts in the field of education such as no 
other country with a comparable level of development 
has undertaken. The results achieved were impressive: 
by 1977 the literacy rate was 93 %, participation rates at 
all levels of education had increased significantly and 
the proportion of skilled workers had more than trebled. 
The labour force was not only highly qualified = it also 
displayed extremely good discipline, a willingness to 
work, mobility and adaptability. 
13 Cf. here and in subsequent paragraphs M. E l i ,  op. cit; C. P. 
F r a n k Jr.: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
Republic of Korea, in: Trade Strategies for Economic Development: The 
Asian Experience, published by the Asian Development Bank, Manila 
1975, pp. 133-187, in this context p. 159 ft.; L. E. W e s t p h a I, op. cit. 
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Growth was also stimulated by the vast reservoir of 
people with business acumen and management 
qualities on which the country could draw. The great 
number of refugees who had fled from North Korea 
during and after the Korean War included many 
qualified people who saw no opportunities to develop 
their abilities under the communist regime in the 
North. TM 
Labour was therefore of great importance for the 
development of the country. In spite of all the 
reservations that must be felt with regard to 
methodology and source data, the results of estimating 
a Cobb-Douglas production function for the factors 
capital and labour give an idea just how important it was, 
for it explains the growth over the period as a whole 
predominantly in terms of labour. In the sixties, when 
high labour intensity coincided with high labour 
productivity, the calculations ascribe as much as nine- 
tenths of the growth to labour. 15 
Though unquantifiable, the political environment was 
certainly also of great significance for economic growth. 
The remarkable political stability of the leadership 
deserves particular mention. 
Positive Effects of Economic Policy 
The efficiency of capital deployment was enhanced 
not only by these complementary factors but also by the 
Government's economic policy. 
The country attempted to establish and preserve 
undistorted price relations for goods and factors of 
production. This becomes evident in the trend in the 
prices of capital and labour, for example. Whereas in the 
years following the interest rate reform in 1965 real 
interest rates were predominantly positive, the level of 
real wages did not rise in the period 1958-66, when 
unemployment was still high. A progressive tightening 
of the labour market led to real wage increases in later 
years, but until the mid-seventies these remained below 
the gain in labour productivity. 16 
Similarly, the country's outward orientation had as its 
backcloth the establishment and maintenance of 
14 Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden: Allgemeine Statistik des 
Auslandes, L&nderberichte, SQd-Korea 1975, Stuttgart and Mainz 
1975, p. 20. 
15 The calculations were carried out by analogy with the procedure 
followed by P. D e s a i : The Productivity of Foreign Resource Inflow 
to the s Economy, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, 
May 1979, pp. 70-75, and by R. E r b e : Foreign Indebtedness and 
Economic Growth: The Philippines, in: INTERECONOMICS, No. 3, 
1982, pp. 125-132. 
16 Between 1970 and 1975 real wages rose by just under 6 % a year, 
while labour productivity improved by over 9 % a year over the same 
period. 
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realistic exchange rates. The currency was devalued by 
a large amount in 1964, and thereafter it fluctuated 
much less than previously and was kept relatively stable 
in real terms. 17 Attention to the country's international 
competitiveness increasingly became the maxim of the 
industrialisation strategy. The extensive measures 
introduced 'in the early years to promote exports were 
gradually reduced and imports were liberaiised. A 
detailed examination shows that by the end of the sixties 
the effective protection enjoyed by the great majority of 
industries was already low by international standards. 18 
The closeness of the link between undistorted prices 
of goods and factors and the efficiency of resource 
allocation was again brought home to South Korea in 
the second half of the seventies, but this time 
increasingly from a negative point of view. With the 
persistence of high rates of inflation capital investment 
attracted increasing subsidies. In 1980 Woronoff 
identified more than one hundred different interest rates 
depending on whether or not a sector was to be 
promoted and to what extent. 19 
In addition, the rise in real wages at a much faster rate 
than labour productivity in the second half of the 
seventies together with insufficient exchange rate 
adjustment to international inflation differentials 
increasingly jeopardised the competitive price and cost 
advantages South Korea had previously enjoyed. 
Capital productivity fell markedly. The nadir was 
reached in 1980, when gross domestic product 
contracted in real terms for the first time since the end of 
the Korean War. 
The Government hen enacted a series of corrective 
measures, some of them quite drastic. Nominal lending 
rates were increased substantially, incomes policy 
prevented further real wage increases in excess of 
improvements in labour productivity and the currency 
was devalued by 20 %. This economic policy brought 
the country back onto a growth path: gross domestic 
product rose by 7.1% in 19812o and, according to 
provisional figures, still managed an increase of 5.4 % 
in 1982 in spite of the difficult conditions worldwide. 21 
17 Cf. B. B. A g h e v I i : Exchange rate policies of selected Asian 
countries, in: Finance and Development, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 
39-42. 
18 Cf. L. E. Westpha l ,  K. S. K im:  Industrial Policy and 
Development in Korea, Washington, D. C., 1974. 
19 Cf. J. Woronof f :  South Korea: Park's gone, but his 
infrastructure lingers on, in: Asian Business, Vol, 16, December 1980, 
pp. 66-69, in this connection p. 70. 
2o Of. Bank of Korea: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 36, 1982, No. 5, p. 
134ff. 
21 Cf. P. O d r i c h : In Ostasien herrscht for 1983 Optimismus, in: 




The Savings Ratio 
1960 1960-69 1970-80 1980 
Overall savings ratio 1.5 10.2 25.2 23.4 
Public-sector savings ratio -1.9 3.0 6.2 6.1 
Private-sector savings ratio 3.4 7.2 19.0 17.3 
- households -1.4 a 0.8 6.5 n.a. 
- firms 6.7 a 6.4 12.5 n.a. 
a 1960-62. 
n.a. not available. 
Sources :  P. Hasan and D.C. Rao: Korea: Policy Issues for 
Long-Term-Development, Baltimore and London 1979, S. 470; E.S. 
M a s o n et. al.: The Economic and Social Modernization of the 
Republic of Korea, Cambridge tc. 1980, S. 107; W o r I d B a n k : 
World Development Report 1982; the authors own calculations; cf. K. 
Fertig op. cit. 
On the whole, South Korea's rapidly growing capital 
stock displays a high degree of efficiency that was 
encouraged by a series of complementary factors and 
by economic policy. However, critical limitations on the 
borrowing capacity of developing countries often derive 
less from the low efficiency of capital deployment han 
the fact that a large proportion of foreign borrowing is 
used for consumption rather than investment. In certain 
circumstances the inflow of external resources has an 
adverse effect on domestic savings formation. 22 
Use of Resources for investment Purposes 
In Korea domestic savings were extremely low just 
two decades ago. In 1960 the savings ratio stood at only 
1.5 %. More than four-fifths of investment could be 
financed only by extensive recourse to foreign capital. 
The inflow of resources from abroad remained high in 
subsequent years, but it was only because domestic 
savings formation was expanding rapidly at the same 
time that investment could be increased at a rate 
unknown anywhere else in the world. There was a 
steady rise in the sixties, with the marginal savings ratio 
reaching a value of about 25 %,23 but in the seventies 
there was no consistent trend. The average savings 
ratio stood as high as 24.1% in 1973, fell to 18.9 % by 
1975, rose again to 26.6 % by 1979 before slipping back 
to 23.4 % in 1980. 
Both private-sector and public-sector savings 
contributed to the rapid increase in domestic savings 
over the period under examination. The rise in the 
private-sector savings ratio was determined essentially 
by the trend in corporate saving, which grew 
continuously. Corporate saving represents retained 
profits; it was significant in this connection that the State 
never introduced tax measures that interfered 
146 
excessively in the generation and use of profits. The 
positive real interest rates that obtained for most of the 
period after the 1965 interest rate reform encouraged 
saving by households, although this was subject to 
fluctuations, as was public-sector saving. Nevertheless, 
here too a sound fiscal policy eradicated the negative 
public-sector savings ratio that had still prevailed in 
1960. The remarkable thing is that this was achieved not 
only by increasing tax revenues but also by reducing 
public-sector expenditure on consumption in relative 
terms, a rare achievement. 
In the light of the encouragement economic policy 
gave to saving, the discontinuous trend of the savings 
ratio in the seventies would not seem to be attributable 
to the use of foreign capital for consumption purposes 
over the longer run. It is more likely that the fluctuations 
were simply the domestic reflection of growing external 
imbalances in 1974-75 and 1979-80 as a result of the oil 
price rises: with a reduced volume of resources 
available for distribution, short-term inelasticity in 
consumer behaviour caused a temporary fall in the 
savings ratio. At the same time, however, investment 
was increased further by means of greater foreign 
borrowing. The investment ratio rose from 25.6 % in 
1973 to 31% in 1974 and from 31.2 % in 1978 to 
35.4 % in 1979. 
The analysis suggests that South Korea channelled 
the inflow of foreign capital into investment, but even if a 
part had been used for consumption, the high 
profitability of capital deployment would have ensured 
more than adequate earnings to cover interest on the 
loans. 24 The question remains, however, whether this 
income was generated in foreign currencies. 
Strong Competitive Position 
on World Markets 
In 1960 South Korea's ability to make real transfers of 
foreign currencies for debt service payments was 
extremely limited: exports of goods totalled US $ 31.8 
22 The so-called substitution theory. See in this connection P. 
M o s I e y : Aid, Savings and Growth Revisited, in: Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, VoI. 42 , 1980, No. 2, p. 79 ft., and the 
literature mentioned there. In more recent works, S. S c h a t t n e r, 
examines this link for countries with mineral raw materials. Cf. S. 
S c h a t t n e r : Mineral Economies - Indebtedness without Growth, 
in: INTERECONOMICS, No. 5, 1982, pp. 234-240, in this connection 
p. 239 f. 
23 Cf. P. H a s a n .: Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing 
Economy, A World Bank Country Economic Report, Baltimore and 
London 1976, p. 6. 
24 According to a calculation based on the assumption that just under 
one-third of the inflow of resources was used for consumption i  the 
seventies, the marginal productivity offoreign capital would have been 
roughly 28 %, a figure that is still well above real interest rates abroad. 
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million, oniy 3.4 % of gross domestic product. In the 
years that followed, however, the country's foreign trade 
position changed dramatically. For twentyyears exports 
were increased at a rate that no other country in the 
world could better, 25 making South Korea one of the 
leading trading nations of the Third World. By 1981 the 
country had a 1.2 % share of the world market, placing it 
in 16th position in the world export statistics according to 
country. 26 
Export growth was powered by exports of 
manufactured goods. In the sixties this meant initially 
textiles and other light industrial products. In the 
seventies the range of export goods was greatly 
diversified to include increasing quantities of capital 
goods, chemical products and goods such as electronic 
equipment hat called for a high level of technology and 
a well-educated, skilled work force. Over the period 
under review the country showed an impressive 
increase in its ability to offer goods that were competitive 
in world markets. 
The capacity for real transfers did not, however, 
increase to anything like the extent that might be 
assumed in view of the country's unprecedented export 
growth. The paucity of natural resources and the 
determination to expand the economy by making 
intensive use of foreign technology led to an equally 
rapid increase in imports. In the seventies the fact that 
the country imports all its oil requirements was 
extremely important in this regard. The large trade 
deficit was reduced only slightly as a proportion of GDP. 
However, the highly efficient deployment of external 
resources gave creditors the necessary confidence for 
the real transfer associated with debt servicing to be 
largely postponed by means of further borrowing. It 
remains, however, to be seen whether South Korea will 
be as successful in future as it has been in the past. 
Risks and Opportunities for the Future 
The Achilles heel for South Korea's further borrowing 
activities lies in the country's heavy dependence on 
world markets. A number of studies have shown that 
South Korea must achieve export growth of 12-14 % a 
year in the eighties if its gross domestic product is to rise 
at a rate of 8-9 O//o,27 In the past, nine tenths of export 
turnover was in trade with industrial countries. In many 
25 Cf. W o r I d B a n k : World Development Report 1982, pp. 124- 
125. 
26 Of. L. J u I i t z : Zuversicht nut for wenige L&nder. Der Welthandel 
bleibt flau, in: Frankfurter AIIgemeine Zeitung, 10.5. 1982, p. 13. 
27 C f .K .W.  K im:  South Korea, in:Chr. Saunders  (ed.):The 
Political Economy of New and Old Industrial Countries, London 1981, 
pp. 159-182, in this connection p. 175. 
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of these the persistence of recession has recently 
strengthened the trend towards protectionism. In view of 
the limited possibilities for South Korea to divert exports 
to the Third World or the Eastern bloc, this casts distinct 
shadows on its future export prospects. In addition, past 
experience has shown the dangers that the continuing 
dependence on imports holds, particularly for the terms 
of trade. 
The risks inherent in future world developments 
cannot obscure the fact that South Korea is also in a 
favourable position as regards the requirements for 
growth in the eighties. The country can continue to rely 
on an abundant, highly qualified reservoir of labour, 
which offers opportunities to employ modern technology 
on a large scale in order to raise productivity. It therefore 
has the possibility of establishing a prominent 
competitive position in world markets in high technology 
products. If this is viewed in conjunction with the broad 
diversification of the range of export goods that has 
already taken place, Korea's overall export prospects 
are bright in comparison with those of other countries. 
In future, domestic demand will probably make a 
greater contribution to growth than in the past. With a 
population of more than 38 million in 1980, the country 
has a substantial home market that shows good 
prospects of expansion in view of the level of per capita 
income that has now been reached. 
The assassination of President Park in 1979 was 
followed by a short period of disturbances, but political 
stability has now been restored. The main prerequisite 
for a continued growth policy oriented towards the long 
term is therefore present. In the past the private sector 
has demonstrated its dynamism and flexibility, so that 
there is a high probability that the country will seize the 
opportunities presented to it and will thus create the 
conditions in which it will be able to continue to use 
foreign capital sensibly in the development process in 
the eighties. 
Nevertheless, the success of the future borrowing 
programme will probably depend largely on whether the 
return to relatively undistorted prices for goods and 
factors of production initiated in 1980 will be sustained 
and complemented by other economic measures. 
There would seem to be particular need for curbing 
inflation in further periods of growth, abandoning the 
system of interest rate and export subsidies and making 
further rapid and flexible exchange rate adjustments. If 
South Korea holds to this course the success of the 
country's growth and borrowing policies will continue to 
distinguish it favourably from the vast majority of other 
highly indebted developing countries. 
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